How can global economic regimes be “embedded” to become more equitable, inclusive and responsive to social concerns — particularly those of developing countries? Ibis thesis explores this policy question through a case study of the evolution of the global intellectual property regime as it relates to pharmaceuticals “the global IP regime”) from 1994-2009. Encapsulated in the World Trade Organization Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, the global IP regime of the 1990s required developing countries to grant stringent patent monopolies on medicines, however, the regime has since evolved to afford substantively greater policy space for developing countries to take into account public health needs. How did this regime change come about? Beginning around 1995, a small set of developing country governments, civil society organizations, and experts succeeded in de-stabilizing the legitimacy — and thereby the authority — of the IP regime by problematizing and beginning to re-frame IP rules as a social issue. This re-framing attracted new actors and resources, facilitating further re-framing and the shift of IP debates into new institutional arenas, such as the World Health Assembly. The movement for global access to AIDS treatment created a policy crisis from 1999-2001, which opened a window of opportunity for regime change； codified in the WTO Doha Declaration, the revised regime afforded greater priority to health concerns and allowed increased flexibility in IP rules. These new norms were consolidated in the ensuing years through a series of interconnected global and national-level political contests over national legislation, court cases, and policy decisions. By 2009, the IP regime had become at least partially embedded to take into greater account public health concerns reflected in changes in formal and informal rules, norms, and the discourse and practices of all the relevant actors. By using global networks to tap into a broad range of power resources normative, structural, institutional, expert and economic), a loose coalition of developing country governments, CSOs and experts changed the global IP regime. The case demonstrates how relatively “weak” actors in the global system can marshal various sources of power to render global economic rules more equitable and inclusive.